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ABSTRACT 
 
 
At a time of such great turbulence, looking to the future directions of capital markets and their regulation in 
developed economies is a particularly risky business.  We are in the midst of a great sea change. 
 
Nevertheless, there are several current, and readily observable,  phenomena which are likely to shape capital markets 
regulation in the near future.  First of all, the blurring of the distinctions between developed and developing markets 
themselves, as well as that between  domestic and international markets,  has put into question the adequacy of 
existing regulatory frameworks. Also, the transatlantic dialogue, London – New York, has given way to the rise of 
“multipolarity”; in an age of instantaneous transmission of information, capital and risk, competing centres of 
gravity have emerged.  In addition, centuries-old market institutions are undergoing a period of dynamic change, 
producing the equivalent of regulatory jetlag. Among international actors, there are calls for what may be the 
somewhat indiscriminate widening of the “perimeter” of regulation; costs of compliance mount, regulatory 
uncertainty sets in.  To the numerous, conflicting and perhaps unrealisable,  goals associated with capital markets 
regulation has been added detection and prevention of systemic risk.  The two great, albeit quite different, capital 
market regulatory models (those of the United States and the United Kingdom) have taken a beating; it ist an open 
question as to what will take their place.  Finally, in face of the virtually insurmountable difficulties of actually 
creating  a World Financial Regulator (to say nothing of its desirability), two organisations, one created in direct 
response to the Global Financial Crisis, and the other, decades-old, are filling the void. 
 
None of these factors operates independently, of course; all interact,  contributing to the potential uncertainty and 
complexity of outcomes. 
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The Wider Context:  The Future of Capital Market Regulation in the 
Developed Markets 
 
Cally Jordan 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“All in all, the future global financial regulatory landscape is more likely to resemble a Japanese garden, with new 
details and perspectives emerging at each step, than a centralized and symmetrical jardin à la française.  
Consistency will not be uniformly achieved, the boundary between global and local decision-making will remain in 
flux and controversial, and a spirit of experimentation and institutional entrepreneurship will be required.” 
       (Stéphane Rottier, Nicolas Véron, 2010) 
 
 
At a time of such great turbulence, looking to the future directions of capital markets regulation 
in developed economies is a particularly risky business. We are in the midst of a great sea 
change. 
 
Nevertheless, there are several current, and readily observable, phenomena which are likely to 
shape capital markets regulation in developed economies in the near future:  
 
• The blurring of distinctions between developed and developing, domestic and 
international, markets. 
 
• The rise of “multipolarity” and dispersion of capital market centres. 
 
• The transformation of market institutions such as stock exchanges. 
 
• The changing “perimeter” of regulation and potential indiscriminate overregulation. 
 
• The rethinking of  regulatory goals. 
 
• The questioning of established regulatory models. 
 
• The future role of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the International Organization 
of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). 
 
None of these factors operates independently, of course; all interact, contributing to the potential 
uncertainty and complexity of outcomes. 
 
1. Blurring of Distinctions 
 
For decades now, we have become accustomed to segregating capital markets, considering 
separately “developed” and “developing” markets.1  These distinctions, popular in the financial 
press, are reinforced by the formal distinctions along similar lines institutionalised by 
international organisations, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and The World Bank. 
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Even now, these distinctions are less and less compelling, at least among  large economies.  In 
response to the global financial crisis, the G8 quickly transmogrified into the G20.2  No one 
doubts the significance of China among the world’s leading capital markets;  the HKEx, that 
gateway to China, is now the largest exchange in the world by some measures.3  Brazil’s 
BM&FBOVESPA, the consolidated futures, commodities and securities exchange, has zoomed 
from near oblivion to fourth largest in the world, in less than ten years.4 
 
Contemporaneously, another longstanding distinction, between domestic and international 
capital markets, is blurring, a fact also brought home by the global financial crisis.  Financial 
contagion, a regional phenomenon associated with the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, went 
global.  Contagion demonstrated graphically (and disastrously) that capital markets were not 
watertight compartments, constrained by geographical boundaries and regulated by the exercise 
of national authority. 5  
 
The blurring of these distinctions has put into question the adequacy of existing regulatory 
frameworks as well as proposed regulatory responses.  New powerhouses such as China and 
Brazil, for better or worse, may be going their own regulatory way.  Experiences with the 
development, implementation and assessment of international financial standards are fraught 
with difficulty.6  The recently created FSB, successor to that failed initiative, the Financial 
Stability Forum, is still in its infancy. 
 
Despite widely publicised pressures to “internationalise” capital markets regulation, there 
remains a joker in the pack:  the national interest.  In the United States, the intensely domestic 
focus of the US Congress is offset, to a certain degree, by an experienced and internationally 
aware regulator, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).  But the SEC is not insulated 
from the isolationist winds blowing through Congress.  And, elsewhere, there are vivid examples 
of the “national” interest prevailing even over obvious self interest, for example, in the rejection 
by the Australian Parliament of the proposed merger of the Singapore Exchange with the 
Australian Exchange.7 
 
2.  Rise of Multipolarity 
 
There was a time when world capital markets revolved around the twin poles of London and 
New York.   The hegemony of their market practices and regulatory models was somewhat 
shaken by the Lamfalussy Report in 2001, a wakeup call for European capital markets and their 
regulators,8  and then, a few years later, with the creation of NYSE-Euronext in 2007.  Both Paris 
and Brussels were brought squarely into the picture.  But the  transatlantic dialogue, by industry 
and regulators alike, continued to drown out other discussions. 
 
No longer.  As Rottier and Véron of the Breugel Institute (a Brussels think tank) persuasively 
argue9, the once dominant capital markets of the transatlantic corridor are being challenged by 
the emergence of other centres of gravity, in Asia, Latin America and the Middle East.  Hong 
Kong’s brand new “dim sum” bond market10 is an example, attracting issuers such as the World 
Bank and McDonald’s, issuers which would ordinarily be found raising capital in the exempt 
Eurobond market. 
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Another story, that of Brazil’s BM&FBOVESPA is an especially dramatic one, even by 
“emerging” markets standards.  At the end of the 1990s, the BOVESPA, as it then was, 
considered shutting down.  Trading in Brazilian equities had migrated to the NYSE and the 
American Depositary Receipt or ADR market;11 there had been virtually no initial public 
offerings done in Brazil over a period of several years.  Concerted action by regulators, 
legislators and the BOVESPA itself  (such as the creation of the Nova Mercado or Corporate 
Governance Listing Board) revitalised  Brazilian  capital markets.  The BM&FBOVESPA, now 
the fourth largest exchange in the world,12 recently announced a cross-listing arrangement with  a 
Chinese counterpart, the HKEx.13 And, ironically, given that ADRs nearly undermined the very 
existence of the BOVESPA, it is now possible for non-Brazilian companies to create BDRs, 
Brazilian Depositary Receipts, for trading in Brazil. 
 
There are any number of reasons why rival financial centres would be siphoning capital market 
flows away from London and New York.  The disarray of markets and regulation in both the US 
and the UK immediately springs to mind, as does technology which permits the instantaneous 
transmission of information, capital and, as we all discovered recently, risk. 
 
3. Transformation of Market Institutions 
 
The traditional stock exchange is a powerful and very visible symbol of capitalism, with its 
imposing architecture and seeming timeless solidity.   This centuries old market institution, 
however, is undergoing a radical transformation.  The flurry of international mergers and 
consolidations, completed, proposed and failed, are an outward manifestation of the 
transformative effect of technological change. The formal institutional realignments are belatedly 
catching up with the technological reality.   
 
Much has been written about the fading importance of the traditional stock exchange and the rise 
of competing, virtual exchanges.  The Goliaths are changing business models,14  scrambling for 
strategic geographic advantage and embracing new products.15 As the merger route has proved a 
bumpy one, alliances or alignments are appearing.16 Markets, of any kind, have cultures though 
and roots extending back millennia.  Despite the flash of international mergers, local markets, in 
one form or another, will persist;  the niche markets of Luxemburg and Switzerland, for example.  
And, as recent experience with NYSE-Euronext demonstrates, even the biggest of international 
mergers has not erased the “local” markets involved. 
 
All of this frenetic activity however produces the equivalent of regulatory jetlag. Regulators are 
still trying to adjust to that groundbreaking transatlantic merger of NYSE-Euronext. Occurring 
barely four years ago, it now seems to have taken place in a different lifetime. The great market 
upheaval and change taking place has put enormous stress on even the most basic principles of 
regulation and market practice, segregation of clients’ accounts for example.17 
 
Traditional self-regulation of market institutions has been marginalised in many places, 18 
especially by the rising tide of formal regulation.  However, given the rapidly changing nature of 
market institutions themselves and the impossibility of adequate or comprehensive regulatory 
responses, at least in the short term, new varieties of self-regulation are likely to appear. 
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4  The Changing “Perimeter” of Regulation 
 
Capital markets, especially international capital markets, have always thrived on regulatory 
arbitrage, much of which has been relatively benign:  grease to the wheels of finance.  The 
Eurobond market, for example  attracted stellar issuers such as The World Bank and McDonald’s 
and has been remarkably resistant to formal regulation, seemingly without untoward 
consequences. 
 
But the existence of “unregulated” markets, obvious to anyone close to the industry, apparently 
came as a great surprise to much of the world.  In the United States, the volume of privately 
placed securities (that escape most of the regulatory apparatus) exceeded that of publicly offered 
securities for the first time several years ago. Now, the dominant capital market in the United 
States is the private placement market.  As the name implies, it is a private market, and one not 
subject to the glare of public scrutiny. 
 
So now, establishing the “perimeter” of regulation is the new mantra of the FSB, the IMF, The 
World Bank, IOSCO.  Among other things, and crudely put, this implies sweeping the varied and 
multi-faceted world of derivatives into the regulatory net.  Although indiscriminate regulation of 
derivative products has been plaintively decried recently by the head of the International Swaps 
and Derivatives Association, 19  the forces of torrential regulation are not abating. 
 
At the heart of this particular issue is the artificial, and historically determined, definition of a 
“security” in the United States, a product of the fragmented and fiercely territorial regulatory 
landscape there.  The most well-known financial regulator, the SEC, has never had jurisdiction 
over most derivatives; that authority lies, for the most part, with a competing regulator, the 
Commodities and Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).  Although this artificial distinction 
among financial products (which results in competing regulatory oversight) has been eliminated 
(or never adopted) in many other places in the world, it appears destined to persist in the United 
States.20  Some exchanges in the United States, tied as they are now to specified financial 
products that are aligned with the jurisdiction of their primary regulator, would welcome the 
elimination of these distinctions and an expanded range of tradable products.   In emerging 
markets, some early adopters of the US regulatory model may demonstrated the same 
product/market/regulator fragmentation (Korea, for example), but elimination of the distinctions 
has been occurring, and without any undue reticence.  
Certainly, the avalanche of regulation precipitated by the global financial crisis is worrisome.  
Irrespective of the wisdom, or not, of its substantive provisions, very little of the Dodd Frank 
Act21 has actually been implemented.22  Costs of compliance mount, regulatory uncertainty sets 
in.  By the time implementing agencies such as the SEC plough through their assigned reports 
and other mandates, the world’s capital markets will inevitably have moved on. 
 
5.  Rethinking Regulatory Goals 
 
Addressing systemic risk has popped up everywhere as a new goal of capital markets 
regulation.23  That capital markets, especially international capital markets, could be purveyors 
of systemic risk appears ridiculously obvious in hindsight.  Systemic risk concerns, though, had 
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been the bailiwick of prudential regulators, proceeding on an institution by institution basis, not 
capital markets regulators. 
 
Simply adding systemic risk to what is now quite a lengthy list of capital markets regulatory 
goals, however, does not necessarily produce results.  It may, in fact, be adding one more goal to 
an already long list of conflicting, potentially unrealisable, goals.  The effectiveness of capital 
markets regulation, especially in the United States, is already undermined by the accretion, over 
time, of numerous, ideologically determined objectives. 
 
Take, for example, section 2(b) of the Securities Act of 1933:24 
 
Whenever pursuant to this title the Commission [SEC] is engaged in rulemaking and is required to consider 
or determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, the Commission shall also 
consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition 
and capital formation. 
 
So here we have stated goals, enshrined in legislation, the oldest, and original, being investor 
protection.25  However, the later legislated goals, efficient markets, promotion of competition 
and capital raising, counterbalance, not to say undermine, the original goal of (retail) investor 
protection.  The efficient market hypothesis has long served as a justification for a non-
interventionist approach to market regulation, decidedly at odds with retail investor protection.  
Much the same can be said of promotion of competitiveness and capital formation, an example 
of political ideology disguised as capital markets regulation.  US capital markets legislation is 
laced through with these competing regulatory goals, intensifying its already dysfunctional 
nature.  
 
This may explain the creation of the new US Bureau of Consumer Financial Regulation and its 
oversight by the Federal Reserve.26  Taking retail investor protection, to a certain extent at least, 
out of the purview of the SEC is quite a radical step, an implicit acknowledgement of the 
regulatory difficulties engendered by the burden of competing goals.  However, the creation of 
new, separate “consumer” or retail investor protection agencies (and there may be emulators 
elsewhere)27  entails different kinds of risk, in particular that of low level expertise and lack of 
regulatory “clout”.   
 
Additionally, given the beating which the efficient market hypothesis has taken lately, it will be 
interesting to see whether “efficiency” goals drop out of the regulatory mix.  Certainly, there is 
already reregulation of professional investors occurring and a tacit admission that disclosure is 
not enough, particularly with respect to retail products.28   
 
Shifting demographics and investment patterns too may force reconsideration of regulatory goals 
and their relative priority.  The popularity of more conservative investment products or ones 
which may have a greater or lesser degree of government backing (for example, Pfandbriefe, 
covered bonds, Canada Mortgage Bonds) may in fact be indicative of the market substituting for 
ineffective regulation (which may be as it should be).  
 
And, one area of the market in developed economies which has been subject to chronic 
regulatory neglect constitutes a disaster in waiting:  pension funds and insurance products.   The 
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potential political ramifications of regulatory and institutional failure in this area are explosive.  
For example, the investment models and regulatory guidelines of many large  pension schemes 
in the United States, such as TIAA-CREF29 or CalPERS30, may be now wildly out of touch with 
the new realities of the marketplace (eg., blithe assumptions of a 6%  “safe”  return on 
investment).  In addition, the benefits which they provide to retirees are based on the operation of 
complex, insurance-like products which few retirees understand.  If these scenarios ring a 
familiar bell, they should be sounding an alarm, given recent events.   As the demographic 
profile of the United States shifts inexorably towards an older population, the stresses on these 
plans can only increase. A failure would bring misery to millions, many of them educated, vocal, 
voters.31 
 
6.  Questioning Regulatory Models 
 
For decades now, the United States and the United Kingdom have provided capital markets 
regulatory models for the world.  Although quite different in structure and regulatory philosophy, 
mini SECs and FSAs are scattered all over the globe.   However, the original models themselves 
are in disarray and under attack on the home front.  In the United States, the fragmentation and 
complexity of regulatory oversight of capital markets will continue, flying in the face of logic 
and common sense.  If anything, it will be more of the same, but more of it.  At least one positive 
sign, though, is the SEC-CFTC-FINRA32 alliance which now presents a more coordinated face to 
the world. 
 
In London, the much emulated consolidated financial regulator, the FSA, is currently in the 
process of being dismembered, again flying in the face of logic and common sense.  “[T]here 
was not a clear-cut case for outright abolition of the Financial Services Authority.  Fixing it was 
a solid option in principle and it was politics that dictated a different result”.33 
 
There is much to lament in each of these instances. The United States has missed the crisis-
driven opportunity to rationalise and consolidate its capital markets regulatory framework.  The 
United Kingdom has trashed a sound regulatory model that had not demonstrably fallen into 
disrepair.  The reorganisation of regulatory functions, an effort sapping endeavour, comes at a 
time when regulatory energies could be put to better use elsewhere.   
 
But, especially in the case of the FSA, many other places in the world, which had adopted its 
consolidated financial regulator model, are now left high and dry.  Economies such as France or 
Germany will make their own decisions to carry on, but small jurisdictions and emerging 
markets face a dilemma, whether to persist with a now defunct model or, yet again, follow the 
latest UK path, irrespective of its merits. 
 
7.  Role of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) 
 
Crisis has brought to the surface a number of ideas that rise and sink with various currents. One 
idea, and a misguided one, is the creation of a World Financial Authority, a supra national 
financial regulator structured perhaps along the lines of the WTO.  Given the virtually 
insurmountable difficulties of actually creating such a regulator (to say nothing of its 
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desirability), two organisations, one created in direct response to the global financial crisis, and 
the other, decades-old, are filling the void. 
 
In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) was created in 
1999 with a mandate to serve as both a prophylactic against and as an “early warning” beacon 
for impending cross-border financial crisis.  That it failed miserably at either task is 
indisputable.34  Its successor, the FSB, has an even more challenging mandate, in much choppier 
financial waters.35 Will the FSB escape the fate of its predecessor (i.e. irrelevance)?  Its early 
focus on G-SIFI (Globally Systemically Important  Financial Institutions) is fraught with 
difficulty; housed at the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, it would be hard for the 
FSB to escape a central bank mentality (lacking in capital market sensibilities); and, arguably, it 
is working on the margins (credit rating agencies and executive compensation). 
 
IOSCO, on the other hand, has been in existence since 1983.  Originally a somewhat informal 
talk shop for developed economy securities regulators and institutions, the composition of its 
membership and its role has changed dramatically in the last decade. IOSCO is now an important 
forum for the exchange of information among capital markets regulators all over the world, in 
both developed and developing economies.  The Technical Committee of IOSCO was 
instrumental in the development of International Financial Reporting Standards.  IOSCO has 
assumed the role of a standard setter, and given the considerable technical expertise of its 
members, an informed and knowledgeable one.  In addition, it has now taken on some aspects of 
a think tank, such as the OECD, in undertaking research and publishing technical reports.  
IOSCO may be transforming itself into a body somewhat akin to the now superseded Committee 
of European Securities Regulators, better known by its acronym, CESR.36 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We could indulge in more, much more, speculation as to the future of capital market regulation 
in developed markets.   But for now, let’s leave the speculating to the punters and the hedge 
funds, and take a look back in five years’ time. 
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28
 Sharlene Goff and Elaine Moore (2011), “Banks prepare for deluge of PPI complaints”, Financial Times, London, 
21 April 2011, p. 18. 
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 FINRA is the acronym for the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, a self-regulatory organisation and “the 
largest independent regulator for all securities firms doing business in the United States [overseeing] nearly 4,495 
brokerage firms, 163,450 branch offices and 635,515 registered securities representatives. [The] chief role is to 
protect investors by maintaining the fairness of the U.S. capital markets.” See <http://www.finra.org/> [accessed 15 
November 2011].
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 Eilis Ferran (2010), “The break-up of the financial services authority”, University of Cambridge Faculty of Law 
Research Paper Series, Research Paper 10/04, pp. 1-127, 1. 
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 For more on the FSF, see Cally Jordan (2009), “Does ‘F’ stand for failure: the legacy of the Financial Stability 
Forum”, Legal Studies Research Papers, Melbourne Law School Research Paper No. 429, pp. 1-28. 
35
 “The FSB has been established to coordinate at the international level the work of national financial authorities 
and international standard setting bodies and to develop and promote the implementation of effective regulatory, 
supervisory and other financial sector policies in the interest of financial stability.  It brings together national 
authorities responsible for financial stability in 24 countries and jurisdictions, international financial institutions, 
sector-specific international groupings of regulators and supervisors, and committees of central bank experts.” 
Financial Stability  Board, available at <http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/overview.htm> [accessed 10 
November 2011]. 
36
 CESR was replaced as of 1 January 2011 by a full-fledged pan-European capital markets regulator, the European 
Securities and Markets Authority, or ESMA.  ESMA is one of three newly created pan-European regulators (the 
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other two being the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Authority ( EIOPA)) which have replaced the so-called 3L3 committees of the European Union.
